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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STICKS & STONES
MAY BREAK MY BONES, BUT THE FIRST
AMENDMENT WILL PROTECT ME: FEDERAL
COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDS
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LANHAM
TRADE-MARK ACT'S § 2(A) DISPARAGING
PROVISION AS A VIOLATION OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS.-INRE TAM, 808 F.3D
1321 (FED. CIR. 2015).
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution was
designed to protect an individual's right of speech.' This right, along with
other public rights, faces a heightened analysis when confronted with other
government regulations.2 The Lanham Act ("The Act"), in particular, was
designed to protect consumers against piracy and unfair competition; and,
section 2(a) of The Act adds to this protection because it prohibits registering
any mark that "[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous
matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection
with ... beliefs or bring them into contempt or disrepute."3 These latter

restrictions cannot be justified on the basis that they further The Act's initial
intent to protect consumers from being deceived. 4 The United States Court
of Appeals confronted this analysis in In re Tam and affirmed that the First
Amendment protects the speech of trademark applicants even when that
speech is likely to offend others. 5 However, there are many implications that
flow from this controversial and convoluted decision that remain open as a

1 U.S. CONST. amend I. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states in full:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
2 See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1317-18 (2015) (addressing
government regulations referring to The Act).
3 See The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, § 2 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1051) (outlining,
inter alia, "[t]rademarks registrable on principal register").
4 See In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (prohibiting
mark due to its scandalous and improper imagery did not confuse consumers).
5 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected(Feb. 11, 2016), cert.
granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam 137 S.Ct. 30 (2016) (addressing constitutional validity of section

2(a) disparaging provision).
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result from this recent decision, which will be discussed in this case

comment.
On November 14, 2011, Simon Tam ("Mr. Tam"), the front-man for
The Slants, an all-Asian American dance-rock band, filed an application with
the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") seeking to register the band name.6
Upon review, the examiner determined The Slants could not be a registered
trademark because it was disparaging pursuant to section 2(a) of The Act.7
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB") affirmed the examiner's
refusal to register the mark.8 Mr. Tam appealed the decision, arguing that
the TTAB erred in finding the mark disparaging and, therefore, was not
protected under The Act; a federal court panel, however, appealed the
TTAB's decision.9
After the TTAB's decision, Mr. Tam then went on to appeal the
decision, stating that section 2(a) of The Act is unconstitutional because it
violates the First Amendment on its face; but binding precedent determined

6

See id at 1331 (identifying party seeking PTO registration). Mr. Tam sought registration for

'je]ntertainment in the nature of live performances by a musical band." Id. at 1331 n.2. Mr. Tam
chose to register the mark desiring to "reappropriate the disparaging term," but the PTO examiner
still denied its registration stating that the term is nevertheless offensive. Id. at 1331-32.
7 See infra note 18 (describing unapproved marks under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)). This is Mr.
Tam's second attempt at registering The Slants with the PTO. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331 n.2. In
2010, The Slants was previously denied registration from the PTO because the examiner believed
the mark was disparaging under section 2(a) of The Act. Id. at 1331. Mr. Tam appealed, but the
case was dismissed because Mr. Tam failed to file a brief Id. at 1331-32. In this present
application, the board examiner found that the mark is likely disparaging to "persons of Asian
descent under section 2(a)." Id. The examiner further explained that "'slants' had 'a long history
of being used to deride and mock a physical feature' of people of Asian descent," and even though
the band's intention was to reappropriate the term to be used in a positive light, the examiner
believed that "a substantial composite of persons of Asian descent" would find the term racially
insensitive and offensive to their race. Id. at 1331-32 (citations omitted).
8 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1332 (finding mark has history of mocking and deriding physical
feature of people of Asian descent).
9 See In Re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568-69 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 2015), as corrected(Feb. 11, 2016), cert.grantedsub nom., Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016)
(TTAB discussing case background). Upon appeal, the TTAB reexamined the case; and, when it
analyzed whether Mr. Tam's band name was disparaging:
[T]he [TTAB] pointed to dictionary definitions, the band's website, which displayed the
mark next to "a depiction of an Asian woman, utilizing rising sun imagery and using a
stylized dragon image," and a statement by Mr. Tam that he selected the mark in order
to "owf' the stereotype it represents.
In re Tam, 808 F.3 d at 1332. Furthermore, TTAB found that the mark was disparaging to a number
of Asian people because "[t]he dictionary definitions, reference works and all other evidence
unanimously categorize the word 'slant,' when meaning a person of Asian descent, as
disparaging." Id.
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that section 2(a) does not violate any constitutional rights.'0 Under the
McGinley precedent, the refusal to register a mark under section 2(a) does
not violate the First Amendment." Interestingly enough, several courts,
including the court that heard the case, have been widely criticized for
relying on the McGinley analysis, which was decided almost thirty years
ago. 12 Recognizing that jurisprudence on the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and the protection accorded to commercial speech has evolved
significantly since McGinley, the court issued a sua sponte order rehearing
en banc and asked the parties to file a brief addressing whether section 2(a)
violates the First Amendment.' 3 Oral arguments were heard on October 2,
2015, and the court held that the First Amendment prohibits government
regulators to deny registration even if it finds that speech is likely to offend
others, and therefore held that the disparagement movement is
unconstitutional. 1' Under this ruling, the court vacated the PTO's holding
10

See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1333 (explaining First Amendment rights not affected by section

2(a)); source cited supra note 1 (stating First Amendment rights); In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331-33
(presenting precedent case law from McGinley addressing constitutional rights); infra note 11 and
accompanying text (acknowledging mark holders' assertions that First Amendment rights at issue
in denial of registration).
11 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (finding being unregistered by PTO
does not forbid use of mark). The McGinley analysis addressing the claims of section 2(a) violating
one's constitutional right states:
With respect to ... First Amendment Rights, it is clear that the PTO's refusal to register
appellant's mark does not affect his right to use it. No conduct is proscribed, and no
tangible form of expression is suppressed. Consequently, appellant's First Amendment
rights would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.
Id.
12

See id.; see also In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1333 (listing other federal court rulings applying

McGinley analysis). The McGinley analysis is widely criticized as a "standard" for section 2(a)
issues because the holding does not bear any citation to legal authority, and furthermore, it was
decided in a time when the First Amendment was just beginning to be applied to commercial
speech. Id. at 1333-34 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557,
556 (1980)).
13 See In re Tam, 600 Fed. Appx. 775, 775-76 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (enbanc) (rehearing onwhether
bar on registration of disparaging marks violates First Amendment rights); see also In re Tam, 808
F.3d at 1334 (describing constitutional issue at bar). In addition to the parties' briefs, the court
received ten amici briefs. Id.
14 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358 (holding Act's section 2(a) as unconstitutional). Aside
from the majority opinion, the following judges either concurred, dissented, or concurred in part
and dissented in part: (1) Judge O'Malley concurred, "I agree, moreover that § 2(a) cannot survive
the searching constitutional scrutiny to which the majority subjects it under the First
Amendment... I believe § 2(a) is also unconstitutionally vague. ... under the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution."; (2) Judge Dyk, Judge Lourie, and Judge Reyna concurred in
part and dissented in part, "[t]he statute [is] facially unconstitutional as applied to purely
commercial speech"; and (3) Judge Lourie dissented, "I respectfully dissent ... [o]ne wonders why
a statute that dates back nearly seventy years ... is suddenly unconstitutional as violating the First
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that the mark was unregistrable and remanded the case to the PTO for further
proceedings.15
Following this ruling, Tam filed a petition for writ of certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and on September
29, 2016, the petition was granted. 16 On January 18, 2017, the case was
17
argued in front of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Act was first enacted by Congress for the purpose of providing
a national system for registering and protecting trademarks, and to ensure
mark holders that one's investment is protected from misappropriation by
pirates and cheats.' 8 Federal registration of a mark grants the mark holder
benefits that allow that individual substantive and procedural rights that are
unavailable in the absence of such registration. 19 Per The Act, the PTO must
register source-identifying trademarks, unless the marks falls into a category
under section 2(a), which describes marks that are precluded from
registration and protection.20 If a mark is denied protection by the PTO, the
Amendment. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that a trademark ...is protected commercial
speech. The lack of a federal registration does not alter the informational function of a
trademark..." Id. at 1358-82.
15 See id at 1358 (finding disparagement provision of Section 2(a) unconstitutional).
16 Brief for the Respondent, Lee. v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 195 L. Ed. 2d 902 (2016) (No. 15-1293)
(granting petition for writ of certiorari). Michelle K. Lee, the Director of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, assumed position as petitioner. Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Lee v.Tam
137 S.Ct 196 L. Ed. 2d (2016) (No. 15-1293).
17 Lee v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 195 (2017). See also Oral Argument, Lee v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 195
(2017) (No. 15-1293), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/audio/ 2016/151293 (providing oral argument audio recording).
18 See id at 1328 (explaining codification of 15 U.S.C. § 1052); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992) (protecting consumer and mark holders' rights
and expectations for products). Under federal law, a "trademark" is defined as "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' that can be used by the mark holder to "identify
and distinguish his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
19 See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015) (acknowledging
significance of trademark registration); Park 'n' Fly, Inc. v.Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
218 (1985) (affirming plaintiff's mark registrable provided financial benefits ripe for protection).
See also Emily L. DeStefano, Note, A "RealInterest": Limiting Standing to ChallengeAllegedly
"Scandalous" Trademarks, 39 AIPLA Q. J. 103, 108-09 (2011) (explaining federal registration
benefits over common law protections).
20 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (describing categories of registration
which are forbidden). Under section 2(a), Congress forbids any mark that:
[C]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions,
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or a geographical
indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place
other than the origin of the goods and is first used on or in connection with wines or
spirits by the applicant on or after one year after the date on which the WTO Agreement
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mark holder can still use the mark, but the holder will not have any legal
standing afforded by the PTO, such as trademark infringement protections. 2'

However, Congress limited their explanation for codifying section
2(a) of The Act.22 Although section 2(a) of the Act has been around for

seventy years, there has never been a bright-line interpretation of what is
encompassed within this section.2 3 Instead, the courts are forced to speculate
on the intent behind this section, and must interpret the definitions of
24

"scandalous," "immoral," or "disparaging" by using a subjective view.
Under the Trademark Manual of Exam Procedures
examiner determines whether a mark is approved. 25
that the decision of the examiner does not need input
or supervisors when making this critical decision. 26

("TMEP"), the lone
It is noted, however,
from other examiners
Although limited in

(as defined in section ... 3501(9) [of Title 19]) enters into force with respect to the

United States.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
21 See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1300 (emphasizing legal importance The Act affords);
Amy Howe, Argument analysis: Justice skeptical of federal bar on disparaging trademarks,

SCOTUSblog (Jan. 19, 2017, 6:46 AM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/ argument-analysisjustices-skeptical-federal-bar-disparaging-trademarks
(pointing out trademark protection
advantages).
22 See Megan M. Carpenter & Kathryn T. Murphy, CallingBullsh **t On the Lanham Act: The
2(A) Barfor Immoral, Scandalous, andDisparagingMarks, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 465, 467-

68 (2011) [hereinafter CallingBull] (presenting section 2(a)'s interpretation conundrum due to lack
of Congressional intent).
23 See Brief for the Respondent at 12, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 195 (2016) (addressing
ambiguous definition set forth by section 2(a) for seventy years).
24 Id. at 468 (highlighting Congress' absent explanation of codifying section 2(a) in requiring
courts to speculate about Congressional intent). Furthermore, lack of precedent case law has also
left the courts with little guidance on the interpretation of the words. Id. But see Christine Haight
Farley, StabilizingMorality in TrademarkLaw, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (2014) [hereinafter

Stabilizing Morality] (suggesting section 2(a)'s prohibitions on disparaging marks appropriate).
Although Congress barely explains why section 2(a) is enacted, public policy reveals that section
2(a)'s purpose is that "it seeks to encourage civility by denying the benefits of federal registration
to marks that cause deep offense to a significant portion of the public." Id. at 1025; Bruce C. Kelber,
"Scalping the Redskins": Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams Bearing Native American
Nicknames andImages on the Road to Racial Reform?, 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 533, 560-61 (1994)

[hereinafter Scalping the Redskins] (suggesting section 2(a) reflects government's conscious effort
to preserve funds and services for less controversial marks).
25 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331 (describing TMEP procedures analyzing section 2(a) for
determining whether a mark is "disparaging"); see also StabilizingMorality, supra note 24, at 102324 (highlighting section 2(a)'s subjective difficulties).
26 See Stabilizing Morality, supra note 24, at 1024 (emphasizing issues with section 2(a)).
When determining if a mark is disparaging, a trademark examiner of the PTO considers:
(1) What is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into account not only
dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the other elements in the
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precedent and Congressional explanations, the United States Courts of
Appeals found that a disparaging mark is one that "dishonors by comparison
with what is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or affects or injuries by
unjust comparison. '"27
Modem American culture of recent years has brought forth the
evolution of societal tolerance, along with the development of societal
injustices in the form of "hate speech.1 28 Although it has been noted that
words have damning impact on people and their cultures, section 2(a) of The
Act has been met with substantial concerns of violating one's First
Amendment rights of free expression. 29 Furthermore, The Act's language is
mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in
the marketplace in connection with the goods or services; and
(2) If that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or
national symbols, whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite
of the referenced group.
In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331 (quoting Trademark Manual of Exam Proc. § 1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015
ed.) (citing In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1355-58 (Fed. Cir. 2014))).
27 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330 (quoting In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.
(2014)) (affirming rejection of disparaging mark). The applicants' exercise of free speech was
questioned after attempting to register the mark "Stop the Islamisation of America" in connection
with counter-terrorism services. In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also ProFootball, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 119-24 (D. D.C. 2003) (assessing whether NFL team
name, "Washington Redskins" is disparaging to Native Americans); Greyhound Corp. v. Both
Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.1635, 1638-41 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (identifying that disparaging image of
greyhound dog defecating can confuse consumers of product). In Haro, several Native Americans
petitioners filed a complaint requesting that the TTAB cancel the trademark, "Redskins," which
was an NFL trademarked name for a professional football team. See Haro, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 124
(noting public perception as irrelevant in determining if it is disparaging). After several
appearances, both the TTAB and the district court system ruled that the mark, "Redskins," was
cancelled and the "Washington Redskins, " "Redskins," and "Redskin-ettes" were no longer marks
protected under The Act. See Christian Dennie, Native American Mascots andTeam Names: Throw
Away the Key; The Lanham Act is Lockedfor Future Trademark Challenges, 15 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 197, 206 (2005) (holding discussed). This decision upheld the TTAB's broad
and liberal test for determining what can be protected under section 2(a) of The Act. Id. After the
TTAB' s decision, the case was then taken to the district courts, which reversed the TTAB's holding,
because the court determined that there was no substantial evidence supporting that "Redskins"
was disparaging to Native Americans. Id. Furthermore, the court also found that cancelling the
mark would place the NFL franchise in an undue economic prejudice. Id. at 209. Although the
case has been decided, several scholars consider this landmark case a prime example of the
challenges faced in registering a trademark under The Act. See Todd Anten, Sel fDisparagig
Trademarks and Social Change: Factoringthe Reappropriationof Slurs into Section 2(a) of the
LanhamAct, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 388, 403 (2006) (declaring TTAB's most complete procedural
analysis to date through Haryo decision).
28 See Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and
DisparagingMarks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 451, 452 (2007) (contrasting American society
from time of section 2(a) codification to present day).
29 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (laying out First Amendment rights). See also ProFootBall, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 454 (E.D. Va. 2015) (holding professional
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extremely broad, stating that any person who feels damaged or targeted by
the mark can file to cancel it. g0 Even so, there are few scholarly opinions or
case decisions that address the constitutionality of section 2(a) or discuss
whether it represents an unjustified intrusion on First Amendment

football team name, "The Redskins," disparaging to Native Americans); Scalping the Redskins,
supra note 24 and accompanying text; Stabilizing Morality, supra note 24, at 1024 (discussing
unconstitutionality of section 2(a)); Jeff Royer, Comment, Commercial Speech andFanWebsites
Searchingfor a Method to the Madness, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 628, 630 (2004)
(discussing theory that The Act only applies to commercial speech). Under Cent. Hudson, the
Court explained that commercial speech should be afforded less protection than non-commercial
speech. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson, Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-67
(1980)). See also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 at 565.
The Central Hudson test is applied only when commercial speech concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading. Once that burden is met, the government may only
regulate the speech if: (1) the asserted government interest is substantial; (2) the
regulation directly advances the asserted government interest; and (3) the regulation is
no more extensive than necessary.
Id. at 565 n.14. Compare id, with Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that internet domain names are not commercial speech, meaning The Act is not
triggered).
30 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063, 1064 (2017) (explaining process to petition cancellation of
trademark); DeStefano, supra note 19, at 105 (discussing restrictions and limitations with section
2(a)). A seminal case that highlights the challenges of judicially-created requirements of section
2(a) is Ritchie v. Simpson. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1097-98 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In this case, the
plaintiff filed to cancel O.J. Simpson's mark, "The Juice," "O.J. Simpson," and "O.J." because the
plaintiff claimed that it attempted to justify O.J.'s physical violence towards women, thus making
the marks scandalous. DeStefano, supra note 19, at 105; see Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1097 (holding
anyone with personal stance in getting mark registered should have valid standing). Plaintiff was
not directly connected to Mr. Simpson, and only challenged the mark because he believed as a
Christian man, this would challenge his beliefs. DeStefano, supra note 19, at 105. The court held
that although Ritchie did not personally know Mr. Simpson, he, nevertheless, possessed a real
interest in the registration of the mark and the cancellation request was allowed. See Ritchie, 170
F.3d at 1097-98. This case demonstrates the broad acceptance that anyone can challenge a mark.
See also DeStefano, supra note 19, at 103 (noting broad standing requirement is less frequently
considered an issue). As one critic of the Ritchie decision opines:
[D]oes this decision mean that an animal rights organization has standing to oppose the
registration of pet food marks because they consider the keeping of pets "animal
enslavement?" Could a vegan enthusiast have standing to petition to cancel the
registration of marks for meat products because she considers the killing of animals for
food an immoral act? Would an environmental activist have standing to cancel the
registration of a mark of a company that he considers to be an irresponsible polluter?
The O.J. Simpson decision contains the seeds of an administrative and judicial chaos in
which harassment before the Trademark Board becomes a weapon of the contentious
militant, combative extremist, and well-funded activist.
Id. at 104.
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freedoms. 3' Some scholars have noted, however, that First Amendment
jurisprudence should recognize an ever-evolving change in the meanings
behind words and names, rather than chilling its meanings and social
relations through time and enforcing unnecessary regulation by enforcing
32
section 2(a).
In In re Tam, the United States Court of Appeals considered whether
section 2(a) of The Act violates the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.33 The court examined the breadth of applying strict scrutiny to
section 2(a) of The Act, and determined that because the regulation is based
on the expressive aspect of the speech, any mark being reviewed under
section 2(a) should be viewed as expressive speech.34 Therefore, the court
determined that the limited and narrow protections under commercial-speech
do not apply, making The Act's section 2(a) unconstitutional. 3"
The court reasoned that section 2(a) regulates expressive speech, not
commercial speech, and therefore, strict scrutiny is appropriate.3 6 Before
coming to this conclusion, the government argued that trademark registration
is a form of government; thus, it has a legitimate interest in refusing to spend
31

See Smith, supra note 28, at 467-68 (noting lack of constitutional analysis and authorities'

decisions on alternate grounds); Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the FirstAmendmentBar Cancellation
of Redskins?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 708 (2000) (suggesting issue analysis from other constitutional
doctrines).
32 See Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 613, 615 (1973) (recognizing issues failing
constitutional protection being overbroad); see also Pamela C. Chalk, The Trust Value of
Trademarks: Influencing Who We Are and Who We Want to Be, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 20,
23 (2001). Recognizing the negative effects of chilling meanings has been highlighted in recent
opinions, as one Judge stated:
[W]ords are not always fungible, and that the suppression of particular words "runs a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." [Y]et this recognition always has
been balanced against the principle that when a word acquires value "as the result of the
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money" by an entity, that entity
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word.
Id.at 20 (quoting San Francisco Arts & Ath., Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 403 U.S. 522, 531-32
(1987)).
33 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1345-47 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying strict scrutiny in
analyzing "The Slants" under The Act's section 2(a) prohibition).
31 See id. at 1354-55 (determining expressive speech applies when using section 2(a) analysis
and therefore renders this subsection unconstitutional).
35 See id.(quoting Br. Of Amicus Curiae First Amendment Lawyer's Ass'n at 7) (citations
omitted). "Individuals and businesses refrain from using certain terms as trademarks for fear the
PTO might see the terms as immoral, scandalous, or derogatory, in violation of section 2(a). Such
self-censorship narrows the spectrum of speech in the public marketplace." Id. at 1341.
36 Id.at 1345 (holding section 2(a) unconstitutional). "Denial of federal trademark registration
on the basis of the government's disapproval of the message conveyed by certain trademarks
violates the guarantees of the First Amendment." Id.
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37
funds to protect racially charged slurs to be placed in interstate commerce.
However, the court pointed out that trademark registration is user-funded
instead of tax-payer funded, and is not exempt from strict scrutiny.38
Applying strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny is fatal to section
2(a), thus making it unconstitutional for violating the First Amendment.39

17 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 (1992) (explaining intent of
The Act); In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1356-57 (addressing government's failed arguments to bar
disparaging trademarks).
38 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1354 (striking down codifier's reasoning). The issuance of a

certificate signed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") is not enough to
transfer private expression or registration into government speech. Id.at 1348. Unlike government
monuments, record property titles, street parades, license plates, and copyright registrations, the
government does not require a mark holder to publicly display this certificate signedby the Director
of the USPTO. Id. Instead, the mark holder is free to do what they wish with the certificate. Id.;
see also Patent Process Overview, United States Patent and Trademark Office,
http://www.uspto.gov
/patents-getting-started//patentbasics/types-patent/
patentprocessoverview#step7 (last modified Nov. 24, 2014) (listing steps in patent certificate issuance process).
The mere issuance of a certificate cannot simply convert one's free speech into government speech
to the extent that the government is entitled to regulate its content to the point of violating one's
First Amendment rights. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1354. If the certification was permitted to
transform free speech into government speech, it would place a severe risk of allowing viewpoint
discrimination. Id.
39 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1345 (applying strict scrutiny results infatal assessment of section
2(a) of The Act); see also Brief of First Amendment Lawyer's Ass'n, as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 13, In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (2015) (No. 15-1293) "Individuals and businesses
refrain from using certain terms as trademarks for fear the PTO might see the terms as immoral,
scandalous, or derogatory, in violation of section 2(a). Such self-censorship narrows the spectrum
of speech in the public marketplace." Id.; Carl J. Minniti III, The Lanham Act's Unconstitutional
Hodgepodge, 17 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 315, 322-24 (2016) (highlighting The Act's
inconsistencies). Scholars have noted the blatant problems associated with the violation of First
Amendment rights and content-based regulations. Id. As court justices have pointed out: First
Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id.at 322 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003)). Even worse than laws targeting content are those laws that discriminate
among viewpoints. Id. As Justice Clarence Thomas noted inReedv. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct.
2218, 2230 (2015), allowing the government to regulate speech based on "the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker" is just another way to engage in content
discrimination. Id. Justice Thomas continues to hone into this point by discussing Consol.Edison
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of NY, 447 US. 530, 546 (1980). Id. In Consol. Edison Co., the
Supreme Court refuted a previous ruling which banned utility companies from inserting
controversial issues as well as unpopular public policy issues into billing statements; Justice John
Paul Stevens noted:
[A] regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail
expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the
purest example of a "law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." A regulation
that denies one group of persons the right to address a selected audience on
"controversial issues of public policy" is plainly such a regulation.
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Furthermore, due to the vagueness of the disparaging prohibition in The Act,
section 2(a) is also unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments because the doctrine requires specificity in drafting statutory
language, which section 2(a) fails to do by merely listing its criteria for
denying protection under anything that is "scandalous," "immoral," or
"disparaging." 40 The uncertain nature of section 2(a) places a chilling effect
on speech, and The Act's provision is so vague that even without a First
Amendment challenge, it is still unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment. 4 '
It is clear that the disparaging provision of The Act is
unconstitutional on its face, and as the majority correctly noted, holds no
teeth when applying strict scrutiny. 42 The majority is thus correct in
Id. (citing Consol.Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n ofNY., 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
40 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1342 n.6 ("[T]he PTO admitted that '[t]he guidelines for
determining whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are somewhat vague and the
determination of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging is necessarily a highly subjective
one."') (alterations omitted); see also Robert H. Wright, Today's Scandal Can Be Tomorrow 's
Vogue: Why Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is UnconstitutionallyVoid for Vagueness, 48 How.
L.J. 659, 661 (2005) (discussing unconstitutionality of section 2(a) under several constitutional
rights). The wording in section 2(a) is too broad in scope because "a statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential due process of law."
Id. (citing Conally v. Gen Const. Co, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (criticizing ambiguous wording of
statutes violates due process rights)). See also F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
2307, 2317 (2012) (addressing concerns of applying vague law regulation speech). The Supreme
Court commented that:
[E]ven when speech is not at issue, the void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least

two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should
know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and
guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or
discriminatory way.
Id. As such, a sincere effort is vital in ensuring that ambiguity does not stop First Amendment
rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Id.
41 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358 (O'Malley, and Wallach, JJ., concurring) (plurality opinion)
(emphasizing alternate reasoning to unconstitutionality of The Act's section 2(a) provision). For
section 2(a) of The Act to survive the vagueness issue, the Supreme Court requires that it "give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly." Id. at 1360 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). As
such, First Amendment concerns require a stringent vagueness test. Id. Under the First
Amendment, there are special concerns that arise from content-based regulations of speech because
of the obvious chilling effects on free speech. Id. (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997)).
There must be precision in controlling content-based regulations because it is "an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms." Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993)).
42 See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text (maintaining free speech strict
scrutiny standards, regardless if mark present, is protected by constitutional rights); see also Smith,
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eliminating the precedent found in McGinley acknowledging that under all
considerations, the First Amendment cannot be overlooked when discussing
trademark law. 43 By recognizing that PTO examiners are given tremendous
power to determine what is disparaging under The Act, the courts should
consider a more controlled view when handling the approval process of such
mark registration.4 4
It is clear that Mr. Tam was not attempting to federally register The
Slants mark for malicious purposes. 45 Tam and his band members are not
disparaging Asian-Americans, but celebrating their heritage like a badge of
pride instead. 46 Even Justice Ginsburg noted the missteps of the PTO
registration process when she poignantly opined at oral arguments, "[d]oes
it not count at all that everyone knows that The Slants is using this term not
at all to disparage, but simply to describe?"147 The examiner reviewing Mr.
Tam's application should not have used the term out of context, but rather,
should have looked at the evolution of the term, and the intent of the mark
holder's desire for federal registration. 48
Even then, however, the
government should not directly interfere with one's First Amendment rights,
even ifgovernment regulators find that this speech will likely offend others.49

Furthermore, several justices of the Supreme Court appear to agree in this
supra note 28, at 476 (mentioning expanding TTAB's idea of disparagement test to more rigorous
test than before).
41 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1333-35 (discussing and abrogating In re McGinley, 660 F.2d
481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
44 See Smith supra note 28, at 481 recognizing severe mishandling of one's First Amendment
rights poses serious problems for 15 U.S.C. § 102 1(a)).
45 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1332 (reasoning Mr. Tam's desire to register name was to own
negative stereotype it represents). In counteracting the negative stereotype the slanted eyes
represent among the Asian community, Mr. Tam explained that he chose this name because "I [Mr.
Tam] was trying to think of things that people associate with Asians. Obviously, one of the first
things people say is that we have slanted eyes." Id. at 1333 (citations omitted). Mr. Tam went on
to say "[w]e [The Slants] want to take on these stereotypes that people have about us, like the
slanted eyes, and own them. We're very proud of being Asian we're not going to hide that fact."
Id.
46 Brief for the Respondent, Lee. v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 195 L. Ed. 2d 902 (2016) (No. 15-1293)
(granting petition for writ of certiorari)
47 Oral Argument at 16:34, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 195 (2017) (No. 15-1293), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/audio/2016/15-1293.
48 See id. Denial of the registration mark, on the basis of the examiner's interpretation of
disparaging, was found by applying dictionary definitions, reference works and outside evidence,
such as The Slant's Wikipedia page, which showed that the mark would most likely be used to refer
to people of Asian descent. Id.
41 See id. at 1358 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (explaining church's
homosexual veteran's funeral protest protected by First Amendment even if causing pain to family
members)) (limiting speech cripples freedom of public debate). "Our Constitution protects [the
First Amendment] to ensure that we do not stifle public debate." Id. at 461.
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instant matter, noting that section 2(a) lacks any connection to the ultimate
purpose for codifying The Act in the first place.5"
The balance of finding civility among "hate speech" is convoluted
and seemingly impossible to assess without inserting subjective views on the
issues.5 In the instant case, Mr. Tam's intentions for attempting to reappropriate a negative term into a positive embracement of one's identity
should not have been barred by the PTO examiner.5 2 Nevertheless,
government regulators should not impose one's own view on disparaging
material because doing so creates a chilling effect on free speech, which
undermines the evolution of our ever-changing society that has thrived on
open dialogue between its citizens.53
Even though the most recent decision holds section 2(a) as
unconstitutional, if Congress wishes to keep this section of The Act, then
Congress should look to alternatives in modifying section 2(a); one method
of resolving this constant issue is for Congress to amend The Act in order to
bring it up to date with contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence. 54
This can be done by changing the language of The Act by replacing section
2(a)'s wording from "scandalous," "immoral," and "disparaging" and
simplifying the terms to collectively mean "obscene."55 Doing so allows the
PTO and TTAB to apply the Miller test in determining whether a trademark
can be registered, which sets out a clear set of questions in determining if an
act or words are in fact "obscene. 56 Even though one can argue that

50

See Amy Howe, Argument analysis: Justice skeptical of federal bar on disparaging

trademarks, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 19, 2017, 6:46 AM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/
argument-analysis-justices-skeptical-federal-bar-disparaging-trademarks (describing most recent

oral arguments).
51 See Smith, supra note 28, at 452-53 (evolving cultural norms and dialogue provide unstable
grounds for applying constitutional protections).
52 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358 (vacating TTAB's decision and remanding for further

proceedings).
53 See Smith supra note 2, at 457 (embracing society's diverse views in acknowledging
conservative and liberal undertones are not one in the same).
51 See Kristian D. Stout, Terrifying Trademarks and a Scandalous Disregardfor the First

Amendment: Section 2(A)'s Unconstitutional Prohibition on Scandalous, Immoral, and
DisparagingTrademarks, 25 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 213, 253 (2015) (suggesting alternative
methods in modifying section 2(a) to make it constitutional).
55 See id. (discussing suggestions in modifying The Act's language).
56 See id; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining test for obscenity).

The court applied a set of questions in determining whether a term is obscene on the following
grounds:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
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"obscene" is just as overly vague as the terms presently included in The Act,
the Miller test is relatively straightforward.5 7 However, applying this
application would require a command from the Supreme Court of the United

States, or a revision from Congress, which may take a substantial amount of
unnecessary time to modify and approve.58 Furthermore, Congress can
consider striking down the entire disparagement agreement all together.5 9
Removing the disparagement provision will not harm the rest of The Act, as
the intent of The Act is to "regulate commerce within the control of Congress
by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of the marks in
commerce ... to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use
of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered
marks."60

The In re Tam court, explored the scope and validity of the First
Amendment when examining section 2(a) of The Act's disparaging
provision, and correctly held that under strict scrutiny, this unnecessary

provision is found to be unconstitutional. In this instant case, the government
regulators who examined Mr. Tam's registration request incorrectly failed to

assess Mr. Tam's intent of claiming the mark, which was not for malicious
purposes. Instead of using the term in a racist manner, Mr. Tam wanted to
embrace a negative connotation and attempt to bring people of Asian

heritage together and address the stigma that personal appearances are not
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value[.]
Id.at24.
'"
See id. at 24-25 (applying Miller test to section 2(a) is relatively straight forward).
What is clear, and will clarify the "scandalous" or "disparaging" ambiguity at present, is
that while "obscene" speech may be curtailed, merely "indecent" speech cannot be
restricted by virtue of its content. Importantly, sexual expression may be "indecent" and
not "obscene," and thus deserve protection. For instance, in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, the Court noted that ambiguous legislation that curtails "indecent"
sexual speech deserves heightened scrutiny when it held: "in evaluating the free speech
rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that 'sexual expression which is indecent
but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment."
Stout, supra note 54, at 254.
58 See Stout, supra note 54, at 254 (discussing procedural process necessary to modify Section

section2(a)). It should be noted, that the Supreme Court heard arguments for this case in January
2017. Oral Argument, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 195 (2017) (No. 15-1293), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/audio/2016/15-1293. At the time of publication,
the opinion is forthcoming. See Lee v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 30 (2017).
51 See Stout, supra note 54, at 254 (striking down disparagement provision will not hanm The
Act's intent). As extensively explained, the intent is essential to understanding why removing the
disparaging provision will not ham the rest of The Act. Id.
60 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (addressing original intent provided by The Act).
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damning to one's culture, which the examiners failed to consider. Instead of
shaming one's appearance, from which they cannot change, Mr. Tam aimed
to re-appropriate the racist term to become acceptable, and subsequently
transform it into a positive term in popular culture. Indeed, the court is
correct in striking down the disparagement provision of The Act, and it is
correct to assume that even if government regulators believe that a mark will
likely offend others, it should not preclude one from claiming the mark
because doing so creates a chilling effect on individual freedoms, which this
country was founded on. With the upcoming opinion released by SCOTUS
in the foreseeable future, the fate of The Slants and other members of other
ethnicities, cultures, genders, religions and nationalities seeking validation
for appropriation finally reach the attention of the highest court in the United
States.
The disparaging provision in The Act largely serves no purpose to
the original intent of the statute. Moreover, it represents a major risk of
violating First Amendment rights afforded to citizens. As a country, we
should adapt to the progressive nature of open and free speech, and permit
patent federal mark registration to any mark absent the consideration of
whether it is disparaging or not. Legal doctrines, like language, are not static.
Even though laws should be applied consistently, they should be applied in
the ever- changing societal norms of the present. Given that minority
creators and artists have historically been denied the benefits of intellectual
property protection, intellectual property rights are even more important in
this context; where, as these aforementioned artists and creators have been
denied intellectual property protection in the past, credit and
acknowledgment in their craft is imperative to them. Preventing such marks
challenges our society's opportunity to grow in building an open dialogue
discussing other's stances, beliefs, and views. As such, an overly broad
interpretation of the prohibitions in section 2(a) would chill the
transformative use of works of art, and minority voices will be cast aside and
neglected. Admittedly, it may be challenging to argue that a nearly seventyyear old statute has been unconstitutional since its creation. However, such
an abridgement of time should not hinder Congress' consideration in
reinterpreting the intent of a statute. Instead, The Act and the government
regulators should, as the founding fathers intended, let the American citizens
speak for themselves.
Kimberly T. Aquino

